Choosing The Lesser Evil

There are various explanations of this Gemara. The Imrei Tzvi explains that Aharon foresaw that Zechariah would be killed by his brothers in the Beis HaMikdash. If Klal Yisrael were to kill Chur, Aharon, and Zechariah, there would be no possible repentance for them. They would not be exiled in the times of the destruction of the Temple, but rather they would be destroyed. Aharon made a calculated decision that the sin of idol worship, while severe, would be less severe than the sins that Klal Yisrael would otherwise commit if they killed him. Therefore, he was instrumental in directing the “mob” to serve the Golden Calf.

The Meiri explains that this was a compromise. Aharon could have stood his ground and been killed al kiddush Hashem rather than permitting the Golden Calf. Rashi explains (although Tosfos disagrees) that it was on this compromise of Aharon’s that the verse states, “And a blesser of one who compromises is scorning Hashem.” Rashi clearly understands that Aharon is being taken to task for his inappropriate action.

Aharon saved Klal Yisrael from a severe punishment by directing the mob to transgress a lesser evil. Yet the Meiri says it was wrong. We cannot permit someone to sin to save him from committing a greater sin. Worshipping the Golden Calf was not permitted, and Aharon should not have said that it was—regardless of the consequences.

However, this issue is a little tricky. Although one may not say that a sin is permitted in order to save another from committing a greater sin, the individual himself may make that exact calculation. For example, the Beis Shmuel and Chelkas Mechokek (Even HaEzer 25:1) both rule in accordance with this principle with regard to avoiding the aveirah of nidah, which is considered more severe than some other aveiros. Presumably, if the unruly mob in the Midbar felt they had no choice but to sin and they knew they were not going to overcome their yetzer ha’ra, they should have chosen the lesser sin. But that is not what happened. Aharon told them it was permitted to worship the Golden Calf as a ruse to stop them from performing a worse aveirah. But one should never say that something that is an aveirah is actually not.

There was an American yeshiva that had many ba’alei teshuvah. In this yeshiva, the rosh yeshiva used to come around the dormitory himself waking the boys up for Shabbos davening. On one fine Shabbos morning, one boy told the rosh yeshiva, “I could get up now, but then I will fall prey to my urge to smoke. I would rather stay in bed all day.”

Smoking on Shabbos entails severe biblical prohibitions. And, according to what we stated above, if a person makes a rational calculation that following a certain incorrect course of action will save him from more serious transgressions, then he may make such a calculation. However, it would seem that the rosh yeshiva would not be permitted to encourage the bachurim to stay in bed all day and miss tefillah, k’riyas Shema, Kiddush, and the Shabbos seudos as a ruse to save them from smoking on Shabbos. This would violate the principle of the Meiri that one cannot permit an incorrect course of action as a ruse to save people from more severe transgressions.

The rosh yeshiva should say that it is very important to pray, recite Shema, etc., and that there is no permit not to fulfill those mitzvos. Yet if anyone personally feels that if he gets out of bed he will end up smoking, then he should choose to do the lesser evil and stay in bed. This is in accordance with what was stated in hilchos nidah—that one who knows that either course of action he follows will be forbidden should choose the lesser evil.

Tosfos understands the Gemara completely differently and explains that Aharon was actually praised for his actions. Perhaps he disagrees with the Meiri cited above.

May Hashem grant us the fortitude to never have to make such calculations. ™